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Abstract     
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on interest-free finance by 
investigating the feature of interest-free (IB) and conventional banks (CBs) in 
Quatar over the period 2005–2014. To distinguish between IBs and CBs, we use 
at first stage two-sided t-test. With univariate descriptive analysis, compaired 
to CBs, IBs are found to be riskier and less stable, but have a higher liquidity, and 
are more solvent. Then, multivariate regression based comparision say that IBs 
are found to be riskier, less liquid except for Large IBs, less solvent except large 
IBs, more capitalized, less profitable post GFC (except High share IBs), and more 
stable. At third stage, PVAR-X specifications analysis revealed that IBs are found 
to be more capitalized, less profitable, and less stable except Small IBs and Post 
GFC. It is the Small IBs wich are less solvent even post GFC while higher market 
share IBs are more solvent.  
 
JEL classification:  G01 G21 G28 G32 Z12  
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I. Introduction 
 
Islamic banks might vary significantly across different size buckets. Smaller 
Islamic banks might be more affected by the higher cost inefficiency of Islamic 
banks as the design of Sharia-compliant products and compliance costs might 
involve scale economies. Similarly, the absence of risk diversification tools might 
affect smaller more than larger Islamic banks. (Čihák & Hesse, 2010) find 
significant differences in stability between small and large Islamic banks, with the 
former being more stable and the latter being less stable than conventional banks.2 
The differences between Islamic and conventional banks are more prominent for 
smaller Islamic banks. This variation is partly due to the difference in the market 
share of Islamic banks in considered countries which is likely to reflect the 
different levels of maturity, sophistication and competitive behavior of  their 
banks (See (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013)). (Maggiolini & 
Mistrulli, 2005) survey, showed a correlation between the life duration of a bank 
and the market share of larger banks: the life duration of a bank is higher when 
there is a lack of banks on the market, and smaller in the opposite case. 
 
In time of downturn, Islamic banks are expected to suffer more than 
conventional banks. It would be interesting to empirically test this hypothesis and 
to compare between the performance of Islamic banks vs conventional banks 
before and after the 2008 economic downturn (GFC). For 25 Gulf Council 
Countries’ (GCC) banks classified as Islamic and conventional for the period 
2001-2013, (Al-Deehani, El-Sadi, & Al-Deehani, 2015) analysis revealed  
statistically significant difference in performance between the two types of  banks. 
 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on interest-free finance by 
investigating the feature of interest-free (IB) and conventional banks (CBs) in 
Quatar over the period 2005–2014. 
In this research we use an array of variables which are carefully selected based on 
the consultation with the existing literature. Our purpose is to examine the 
differences (in terms of Profitability, Liquidity, Credit and Insolvency risk, and 
                                                          
2 In terms of stability, the proposition of ‘too big tofail’ might prompt a larger bank To assume more risk and hence 
the relationship between size and stability is expected to be negative (Miah & Uddin, 2017). 
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Stability) between Islamic and conventional banks in Quatar. Our sample contains 
9 banks (6 conventional and 3 Islamic) operating in Quatar for the calendar years 
2005–2014. 
To distinguish between interest-free and conventional banks, 12 financial ratios 
are used in this study. We classify these ratios into six general categories: 
profitability ratios (ROA, and ROE), liquidity ratios (CTA, and CTD), credit 
risk (LLR, NPL, LTA, LTD), insolvency risk (DTA), Reglementary risk (CAP), 
and asset structure ratios (FAA, OBSIA). We use also the Z-score as measure of 
bank stability.  
For the comparisons study, three technics are considered:  
i) Univariate analysis based on t-test comparisons,  
ii) Multivariate Regression based comparisons analysis,  
iii) Quantitative analysis based on PVAR-X specifications. 
Regression based comparisons analysis concern five differents dimension.  First, 
we Compare interest-free and conventional banks (CB) controlling for bank 
characteristics. Second, we Compare islamic banks (IB) and CB cross different 
Size groups. Third, we do analyse cross IB difference. Forth, we take account of 
Market share side for islamic banks. Fiveth, we take account of post 2008 Global 
Finance Crisis (GFC) effect on IBs caracteristcs. 
PVAR-X specifications will be estimated to test for comparisons between IBs and 
CBs in controlling for bank characteristics, between small and large banks, 
between High share banks, and between Pre and Post the GFC for all banks. 
This paper is organized as follow. After a brief introduction (section I) listing 
different technic to be used, section II gives some principles of islamic banking. 
Section III describes the data and defines the ratios used in the study. It gives also 
a univariate descriptive comparative study between IB and CB based on t-test 
statistic. Section IV presents some OLS linear regession model results, while 
Section V discusses results for Panel VAR-X model. Section VI concludes. 
II. Principles of Islamic banking ; what difference with 
conventional ones ? 
 
Islamic financial system is based upon a commerce law known as fiqh al-
mu’amalat. This law considers issues of social justice, equity, and fairness in 
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all business transactions, and promotes the entrepreneurship, protects the property 
rights and emphasizes the transparency of contractual obligations according to 
divine law of Allah and his last messenger Muhammad (PBUH صلى الله عليه وسلم≡ ). It is based 
on Shariah approved products which do not involve Riba (interest/usury), 
gharar (uncertainty), maisir (gambling), and non-halal (prohibited) activities. 
Although Islam has allowed the profits, but the pre-determined fix amount of 
returns is not allowed. Risk of loss and variability of profits must be faced to get 
the returns ( (Ariss, 2010) and (Salman & Nawaz, 2018)). The Islamic banks have 
regulations of two types; first is the government and the central bank that govern 
the conventional banks as well and the other is the Shariah Supervisory Board 
that approves the products of the Islamic banks and keeps a check over the 
implementation of the rules defined by the board (Salman & Nawaz, 2018). 
(Khan, 1987) argues that the theoretical model of Islamic banks (IBs) can  
successfully fill the failure of CBs in maintaining stability. In fact, IBs are 
assumed to separate investment funds from demand deposits and apply 100% 
reserve on the latter. IBs are different from CBs because they operate upon the 
principles of the Islamic law (the Shari'ah) which prohibits the payment or receipt 
of interest (riba) and encourage risk sharing. 
CBs use both debt and equity to finance their investments, while IBs are expected 
to depend primarily upon equity financing and customers' deposit accounts, i.e., 
current, saving, and investment. (Hanif, 2011) provides a detailed discussion on 
the differences and similarities in Islamic and conventional banking. The 
following Table  summarizes that  discussion :3 
 CB IB 
 
Return Risk bared by Return 
 
Risk bared by 
Savings Interest Bank Profit 
 
Saver 
Finances 
 
Interest Spender Profit Spender 
 
IB cannot charge fixed interest in advance, they operate by participating in the 
profit resulting from the use of bank funds. The concept of interest is replaced by 
profit and loss sharing (PLS). Based on these practices, savers face limited risks 
with a CB because savings are considered liabilities. However, savers face 
                                                          
3 Comment : Interest and profit charged are comparative and almost equal. For an IB risks are transferred 
to savers and spenders. 
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unlimited risks with an IB because savings are considered neither a liability nor 
equity. In addition, the cost of capital in conventional banks represents the cost of 
debt and equity. While, the cost of capital in Islamic banks is replaced by profit 
and loss sharing by depositors and equity holders in Islamic banks. Islamic 
banking proposes two major types of contracts: non-participatory or asset-based 
contracts (Murabahah, Ijarah, Istisna, and Salam) along with the risk-sharing or 
equity-based contracts (Musharakah, Mudharabah). 
Islamic banking is risk sharing, since IB should operate only using profit/loss 
sharing arrangements (PLS).4 The two most popular forms of PLS are Mudaraba 
and Musharaka. IB receive funds from the investing public on the basis of 
Mudaraba (profit sharing).5 Then, it find borrowers (entrepreneurs) who will use 
the funds for investments that are approved by the bank (Musharaka).6 The 
entrepreneurs share the profit/loss with the IB. The bank then pools all profits 
and losses from different investments and shares the profit with depositors of 
funds according to a predetermined formula. IB are partners with both depositors 
and entrepreneurs and they share risk with both; see (Olson & Zoubi, 2008). 
Moreover,  Islamic banks use some asset-backed debt instruments, such as 
Murabahah (sale of merchandise on credit) and Ijarah (operating lease), instead 
of such joint-venture financing modes as Musharakah (profit and loss-sharing) 
and  Mudarabah (profit-sharing contract); see (Louhichi & Boujelbene, 2016). 
The difference between IBs and CBs should also be reflected on the asset side 
since IBs have developed interest free financing instruments based on two  
principles: Profit and loss sharing (PLS) and markup principle ( (Hassan, 
Farhat, & Al-Zubi, 2003); (Zaher & Hassan, 2001)) and they have different risk 
profiles.  However, it seems that the practice of IBs is not diverging from that of 
CBs since all over the world IBs are relying more on markup financing modes 
rather than PLS based financing  instruments (Siddiqi, 2006). Islamic financial 
                                                          
4
 In addition to the PLS activities, Islamic banks may engage in other activities like lease and fee-based 
services. For example, Islamic banks may receive fees through: (i) consultation and professional 
services, fund placements and trust services (Ju’ala), (ii) agency contracts (Wakalah), (iii) lease 
contracts (Ijarah), (iv) purchase and sales contracts (Murabaha) (Doumpos, Hasanb, & Pasiourasa, 
2017).  
5 The bank is allowed to use the funds in any activity that the management feels appropriate, so 
long as the activities are not forbidden by Islamic laws. 
6
 Islamic banks replace loans with investments that are generally riskier than secured interest bearing 
loans. 
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modes based on mark-up (e.g.  Murabaha, Ijaras, and Istisnaa) require that a real 
asset underlies the financial transaction. Consequently, financial assets and 
derivatives based on other debt financial assets cannot be traded. This linkage 
with the real economy  reduces leveraging and prevents the exposure of IBs to 
speculative behaviour  that leads to instability (Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013). 
Islamic banks should hold better quality assets than conventional banks for two 
reasons. First, under (PLS) contracts, the Islamic bank does not require collateral 
from the entrepreneur to mitigate credit risk (Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013). Second, 
For debt-based contracts (mark up), once the loan is issued, the bank cannot sell 
it or shift the risk to a third part by any means because debt selling is prohibited 
under Islamic finance principles ( (Ahmed, 2009) and (Zainol & Kassim, 2012)). 
The composition of the assets portfolio of IBs also differs from the one of CBs. 
CBs may diversify their portfolio by allocating part of their funds to nonlending 
investments like interest-bearing bonds that have different risk-return 
characteristics. However, IBs are not allowed to invest in such interest-bearing 
securities, and they can only invest in Islamic bonds (i.e. Sukuk).7 At the same 
time, this means that IBs lack liquid securities on the asset side (Saeed & Izzeldin, 
2016). 
III. Descriptive data analysis and univariate comparisons 
 
Our sample contains 9 banks (6 conventional and 3 Islamic). List of Quatarian 
banks is given at Annexe, see  Table A 1. We have 90 observations, or bank-years 
of data, for banks operating in Quatar for the calendar years 2005–2014. There 
are 60 observations for conventional banks (CB) and 30 observations for Islamic 
banks (IB). 12 financial ratios are used in this study. 8  All are defined in Table 1. 
We classify these ratios into six general categories: profitability ratios (ROA, and 
ROE), liquidity ratios (CTA, and CTD),9 credit risk (LLR, NPL, LTA, LTD), 
insolvency risk ( DTA), Reglementary risk (CAP), and asset structure ratios 
                                                          
7 Sukuk issues do not earn interest payments as conventional Western bonds. Instead they are 
asset-based securities and they are not considered debt instruments. 
8 Source : Bankscope. Panel data are unbalanced. 
9 Liquidity means how quickly a bank can convert its assets into cash at face value to meet the 
cash demands of the depositors and borrowers.  
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(FAA, OBSIA).10 To ensure that our results were not driven by the presence of 
some outliers, we do correct all variables (we did not eliminate extreme values).11  
We use also the Z-score as measure of bank stability; 
Z-score it = ROAit+(EQ/TA)itσROA     
where the subscripts ‘i’ and ‘t’ represent individual banks and time period, 
respectively, ROA is the standard measure of return on asset, Equity to Assets 
ratio (ETA= EQ/TA), and σROA is the fluctuation of ROA indicated by the 
standard deviation, and the subscripts ‘i’ and ‘t’ represent individual banks and 
time period, respectively.12 The higher the Z-score the lower is the bank's default 
risk. 
 
We present descriptive statistics (average value for conventional and interest-
free banks for each variable, number of observation, as well as standard deviation) 
and Difference t-test p-value between two means of each variable (mean for IB 
and for CB) at Table 8 (see Annexe). Difference is significant for Cash to deposits 
CTD, Loans to assets LTA, Loans to deposits LTD, Debt to assets DTA, and Z-
score.  
The risk ratios indicate some important differences in operational characteristics. 
Interest free banks (IFB) extend more loans or equivalents relative to deposits and 
relative to asset (LTD and LTA) than conventional banks. For each credit risk 
ratio in everage, the difference is significant at the 5% level and may suggest 
greater risk for Interest free banks. 
 
Also, the liquidity ratio is significantly different between types of banks. Interest 
free banks keep more cash relative to deposits (CTD). The cash to deposit ratio 
in everage for the Interest free banks was 94.198% which is higher than 9.649% 
                                                          
10
 Regarding the later ratios, we use fixed assets to assets ratio, and off-balance sheet items to 
assets ratio to account for the operating leverage, and off-balance sheet activities, respectively. 
These ratios are used in the previous empirical banking literature (see (Srairi, 2010) and (Ben 
Khediri, Charfeddined, & Ben Youssef, 2015)). 
11
 To control for the remaining outliers, we’ll use a robust estimation technique (an alternative 
method) as a superior estimation method, less sensitive to outliers, proposed by (Rousseeuw, 
Hampel, Ronchetti, & Stahel, 1986).  
12 Z-score (which has been widely used in the literature [see for example (Laeven & Levine, 
2009), (Houston, Lin, Lin, & Ma, 2010), etc) indicates the multiple of a bank's equity buffer before 
it falls into the state of default. 
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ratio of Conventional banks. For this ratio, the difference is significant at the 5% 
level and may supports the better liquidity performance for the Interest free 
banks. 
 
High debt to assets ratio (DTA) is assumed to be indicator of high leverage and 
therefore higher risk of insolvency. Hence, a low value of DTA implies that the 
bank is more capitalized and so more solvent. The deposit to asset (DTA) ratio 
in everage for the Interest free banks was 9.093% which is lower than 18.61% 
ratio of Conventional banks. The difference is significant at the 5% level and may 
supports the better solvency of IBs. 
The higher the Z-score is the lower is the bank's default risk. Conventional banks 
have higher Z-score (3935.873% vs 1880.527%) with significant difference in 
1% level. Then in line with most empirical studies, CBs are more stable than 
IBs.13  
From a brief look at Figure 1, we conclude that : Z-score average evolution from 
2005 to 2014 for islamic banks (IB) is different from one’s of conventional banks 
(CB). The pattern of latter path is decreasing from 2009 (post GFC) and 
increasing pre GFC, while the former has a decreasing path pre and post GFC. 
CB have higher Z-score in mean than IB during period of study. 
From Figure 2, mean of Zscore comparisions in different dimensions say that: 
IB are less stable than CB, Large IB are less stable than Small IB,14 Large CB 
(with islamic window) are also less stable than Small CB, Islamic Banks are less 
stable Post GFC 2008, and all Banks are less stable Post GFC. Between year 
comparison show that Zscore in mean has recently the lowest values, and between 
Quatarian banks (ID),15 94 ≡ Al Khalij Commercial Bank is the more stable bank 
while 102 ≡  Arab Bank Group outlet is the less stable bank.  
                                                          
13 Most empirical research employs the Z-score variable for comparison of stability between the 
both types of banking. For a review see (Boyd & Runkle, 1993); (Čihák & Hesse, 2007); 
(Iwamoto & Mori, 2011); (Laeven & Levine, 2009); (Lown, Osler, Sufi, & Strahan, 2000); 
(Maechler, Worrell, & Mitra, 2007) ; and (Alqahtani & Mayes, 2018).  
 
14 A bank is said to be large if its size > median,  
94 ≡ Al Khalij Commercial Bank,  95  ≡ Barwa Bank,  96  ≡ Commercial Bank of Qatar, 97 ≡  
Doha Bank, 98 ≡  International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C., 99  ≡ Qatar National Bank,  100  ≡ Qatar 
International Islamic Bank,  101 ≡  Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ,  102 ≡  Arab Bank Group outlet. 
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Table 1: Definition of variables and expected signs.16 
Ratios Definitions Expected sign 
for Zscore 
Profitability    
ROA Return on assets = Net income/Total assets + 
ROE Return on equity = Net income/Stockholders’ equity + 
Liquidity   
CTA Cash to assets = Cash/Total assets 
 
CTD Cash to deposits = Cash/Total customer deposits 
 
Credit risk   
LLR Loans loss reserves to gross loans 
- 
NPL Non-performing loans to gross loans 
- 
LTA Loans to assets = Loans/Total assets 
- 
LTD Loans to deposits = Loans/Total customer deposits 
- 
Reglementary risk  
 
CAP Capital adequaty ratio 
 
Insolvency risk    
DTA Deposits to assets = Deposits/Total assets 
 
Asset structure   
FAA Fixed assets to assets = Fixed assets/Total assets 
 
OBSIA Off-balance sheet items to assets = Off-balance sheet items/Total assets 
 
Dummies and 
Interactions 
 
 
IB Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is Islamic, 0 otherwise (i.e. 
Conventional banks (CB)) 
- 
Large Dummy variable equal to 1 if bank is large (size>median), 0 otherwise 
 
Large_CB Inetraction term between large bank and conventional bank.17 
 
Large_IB Inetraction term between large bank and islamic bank.18 
 
D2008 Dummy variable equal to 1 if year > 2008 
 
Bank caracteristics  
 
Size Log(Total asset) 
 
Age  Number of years since the bank was incorporated  
 
Growth  Log(Total assets/Total assets
-1)  
 
Market share percentage of comparison between Islamic banks total asset and 
banks.19  
 
 
                                                          
16 (Ben Khediri, Charfeddined, & Ben Youssef, 2015). 
17
 Give a dummy variable equal to 1 if conventional  bank is big, 0 otherwise (small bank). 
18
 Give a dummy variable equal to 1 if islamic  bank is big, 0 otherwise (small bank). 
19
 Market share=Islamic bank total assets /Country banks total assets x 100%  
(see (Purboastuti, Anwar, & Suryahani, 2015) and (Aminah, Soewito, & Khairudin, 2019)). 
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Figure 1: Quatar Zscore average evolution 2005-2014. 
 
  
Figure 2 : Mean of Zscore comparisons : IB vs CB, Large_IB vs Small_IB , Large_CB vs 
Small_CB, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for IB banks, Pre vs Post GFC 2008 for all Banks, between 
year, and between Quatarian banks (ID). 
IV. Regression based Comparisons analysis between IBs and CBs 
 
While univariate comparisons show significant differences between IBs and CBs, 
these differences could be driven by other bank characteristics. This is to be done 
within regression estimation. Different regression models are considered in this 
section. First, we Compare interest-free and CB controlling for bank 
characteristics. Second, we Compare IB and CB cross different Size groups. 
Third, we do analyse cross IB difference. Forth, we take account of Market share 
side for each type of banks. Fiveth, we take account of post GFC effect on IBs 
caracteristcs. 
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All the variables under the study must be stationary otherwise spurious 
regression may be found. Henceforth, Levin, Lin & Chu, ADF - Fisher Chi-
square, and PP - Fisher Chi-square Unit Root Tests for PANEL data have been 
implemented to ensure that all the bank specific variables in the regression 
equation are stationary. The result is shown in Table A 3. All considered bank 
caracteristic variables are stationary. 
Focusing on a sample of banks with both types allows us to control for unobserved 
time-variant bank-specific effects by introducing bank and year dummies, thus 
a clearer identification of such differences than when comparing banks from 
different types.    
A. Controlling for bank caracteristics 
 
To assess differences in Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, Insolvency, and 
stability across different bank types, we therefore run the following regression: 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜸𝑰𝑩𝒊 + 𝜇𝑡𝑌𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝐵𝑖 + 𝜹 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋𝐷2008 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is vector of Bank caracteristics,  𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = (AGE𝑖,𝑡 , Size𝑖,𝑡, Growth𝑖,𝑡, 𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡, OBSIA𝑖,𝑡)’, 
where 
Age = Number of years since the bank was incorporated, 
Size = Log(Total asset), 
Growth = Log(Total assets) - Log(Total assets
-1 ), 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is one of our measures of Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, Insolvency, and 
stability of bank i,  in year t, 𝐵𝑖 are Bank-fixed effects, 𝑌𝑡 are year-fixed effects, 𝐼𝐵𝑖 is a dummy taking the value one for interest-free banks, 𝐷2008 is a dummy 
variable for GFC (taking the value one from year > 2008), and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
We thus compare IB and CB.   
The results in Table 9 show that IBs have lower Cash to deposits (CTD) and lower 
Cash to assets (CTA), higher Loans to deposits (LTD), higher Capital adequaty 
ratio (CAP), and higher Debt to assets (DTA). IBs are then more capitalized 
and show lower liquidity, higher credit risk, and lower solvency. The 
magnitude of these differences is also meaningful, with IB having a 6.559% point 
lower Cash to assets and a 123.296% point lower Cash to deposits, 96.3959% 
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point higher Loans to deposits (LTD), 25.8155% points higher CAP, and 
129.206% points higher Debt to assets (DTA).  
B. Cross different Size groups 
 
Now, we split the sample of all banks according to their asset Size. Specifically, 
we split the sample into banks above the 50th percentile (Large banks) and banks 
below the 50th percentile (Small banks). We therefore run the following 
regressions: 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜶 𝐒𝐦𝐚𝐥𝐥_𝐈𝐁𝒊 + 𝜹 𝐒𝐦𝐚𝐥𝐥_𝐂𝐁𝒊 + 𝜇𝑡𝑌𝑡 + 𝜇iB𝑖 + 𝜹 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋 𝐷2008 + 𝑢i𝑡   (2) 
where Small_IB is an Inetraction term between small bank and IB (a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if IB is Small, 0 otherwise), and Small_CB is an Inetraction 
term between small bank and CB (a dummy variable equal to 1 if CB is Small, 0 
otherwise), 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is one of our measures of Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, 
Insolvency, and stability of bank i,  in year t, 𝐵𝑖 are Bank-fixed effects, 𝑌𝑡 are 
year-fixed effects, 𝐷2008 is a dummy variable for GFC (taking the value one 
from year > 2008), and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
The results in Table 10 show that small IBs have higher Cash to deposits 
(124.00884 % CTD) while  small CBs have lower Debt to assets (-13.22705 % 
DTA) and higher Z-score (1722.2707%). Small IBs are then more liquid while 
small CB are more solvent and more stable. 
C. Cross-IBs variation  
 
To controll for individual IB caracteristic in assessing the differences across 
different bank types, we therefore run the following regression: 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜸𝒊𝑰𝑩𝒊 + 𝜇𝑡𝑌𝑡 + 𝜇i𝐁𝐢 + 𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋𝐷2008 + 𝑢i𝑡   (3) 
where  
IB is an Islamic Bank indicator, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is one of our measures of Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, Insolvency, and 
stability of bank i,  in year t, 𝑩𝒊 are Bank-fixed effects, 𝑌𝑡 are year-fixed effects, 𝐷2008 is a dummy variable for GFC (taking the value one from year > 2008),   
and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an error term.  
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OLS results of regression (3) for each group of considered measures are given at 
Table 11. Having three islamic banks, we can say that : 
95 ≡ Barwa Bank has more Loans to deposits (158.305% in LTD) and higher 
stability (1849.09% in Z-score). Barwa Bank is then riskier and more stable. 
100 ≡ Qatar International Islamic Bank is less profitable, it has less  Return on 
assets (- 5.284 % ROA) and less Return on equity (- 32.71 % ROE). It has less 
liquidity (- 8. 887 % CTA and -154. 23486% CTD) and more Loans to deposits 
(80.695 % LTD). It is more solvent and more stable; it has lower Debt to assets (- 
20.734% DTA) and higher stability (80.695% in Z-score). Qatar International 
Islamic Bank is then less profitable, less liquid, riskier, more solvent, 
and more stable.  
101 ≡ Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ has less liquidity (- 6.5599% in CTA and - 
123.296% in CTD), more Loans to deposits (80.695% in LTD), and higher 
stability (96.3959% in Z-score). Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ is then less liquid, 
and riskier. 
We continue to find that IBs are riskier. But also, we find that these three Islamic 
banks have more stability in common. 
D. High share Market for IBs 
 
Taking into account differences in Market share, we use additional 
specifications, including interacting the IB dummy with High Market share 
variable (Hshare). To do so, we split the sample all banks according to their 
Market share. Specifically, we split the sample into banks above the 50th 
percentile (high Market share banks) and banks below the 50th percentile (Low 
Market share banks). We use additional specifications, including interacting the 
IB dummy with high Market share dummy. We therefore run the following 
regression : 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇 +   β 𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝜸 𝐇𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝑰𝑩𝒊 + 𝜇𝑡𝑌𝑡 + 𝜇iBi + 𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋 𝐷2008 + 𝑢i𝑡   (4) 
where 𝐻𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐵 = HShare * IB, 
HShare = 1 if Market Share ≥ Median market share, 
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Market share = Bank total assets /Country banks total assets * 100%, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is one of our measures of Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, Insolvency, and 
stability of bank i,  in year t, 𝐵𝑖 are Bank-fixed effects, 𝑌𝑡 are year-fixed effects, 𝐼𝐵𝑖 is a dummy taking the value one for interest-free banks, 𝐷2008 is a dummy 
variable for GFC (taking the value one from year > 2008),  and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an error 
term. 
 OLS results of regressions (4) for each group of considered measures are given 
at Table 12. Rgressions results of Table 12 show that IB with higher market 
share have relatively higher profitability ratios (101.41 % in ROA and 752.01 
% in ROE), have relatively lower liquidity ratios (77.66.7956% CTD) and 
higher credit risk (1166.88 % in LTD, 1.543 in LLR, and 85.077 in NPL) than 
conventional banks and other IB. While IB have higher capitalization (16.2%) 
and credit risk (4.7% in LTA and 18.6% in LTD) than CB.  
We find that IBs have higher credit risk, higher profitability, lower liquidity, 
and higher capitalization than CBs in banks with higher market share of IB. 
E. Post 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) for IBs 
 
Taking into account GFC effect and time trend (long run effect) on IBs, We run 
the following regression: 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇 +   𝛽 𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝜸 𝑰𝑩𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒊 + 𝜇𝑡𝑌𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝐵𝑖 + 𝜇 𝐼𝐵𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (5) 
where 𝑰𝑩𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖𝒊 =  IBi ∗  𝑫𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖,  IBTrendi= IBi ∗ Trend, Trend = t,  𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is one of our measures of Profitability, Liquidity, Credit risk, 
Insolvency, and stability of bank i,  in year t, 𝐵𝑖 are Bank-fixed effects, 𝑌𝑡 are 
year-fixed effects, 𝐼𝐵𝑖 is a dummy taking the value one for interest-free banks, 𝐷2008 is a dummy variable for GFC (taking the value one from year > 2008),  
and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
OLS results of regressions (5) for each group of considered measures are given at  
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Table 13. From Table 13, We conclude that Post GFC, IB have lower rentability 
(- 3.6.0% in ROA and - 24.6% in ROE) but higher capitalization (5.33% in CAP) 
than Pre GFC with higher (lower) risk [14.4% in LTA (-5.7 in LLR and - 5.4% 
in NPL)]. We find also that IB have less liquidity ratios (- 6.45% in CTA) Post 
2008 GFC (Global Financial Crisis). In long term all these effects take the 
opposite results. 
In Quatar, with univariate analysis, compaired to conventional banks, 
interest-free banks are riskier and less stable, but have a higher liquidity, 
and are more solvent in average.  
Regression  based comparision show that  
 In controlling for bank caracteristics, IBs are then more capitalized and 
show less liquidity, higher credit risk, and lower solvency than CBs,  
 in controlling for Size, Small IBs are then more liquid while  small CB are 
more solvent and more stable, 
 a cross IBs, Barwa Bank is riskier and more stable, Qatar International 
Islamic Bank is less profitable,  less liquid, riskier,  more solvent, and 
more stable, and Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ is less liquid, riskier, but  more 
stable than CBs,  
 in banks with higher market share of IB, we find that IBs have higher 
credit risk, higher profitability, lower  liquidity, and higher 
capitalization than CBs, 
 Post GFC, IBs have lower rentability, higher capitalization, higher risk, 
and less liquidity. 
All these results can be summed up as given in Table 5 (given below).  
V. Quantitative Analysis and Findings 
A. Analysis 
 
The analysis concerns here the vector of K=4 endogenous variables :20  𝒀𝒊𝒕 = [𝐋𝐙𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝒊𝒕, 𝑫𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕, 𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕, 𝑪𝑨𝑷𝒊𝒕]’, 
                                                          
20
 This choice is based on signifcant correlations between Z-score and the other variables, see 
Annexe Table A 2.  
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where LZscore𝑖𝑡 = log (Zscore𝑖𝑡), 𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the debt to assets ratio, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the 
Return on assets, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the Capital adequaty ratio, and the subscripts ‘i’ and 
‘t’ represent individual banks and time period, respectively. 
1. Unit-root test 
Among various unit root tests, author has applied Fisher-type unit-root test (See 
Table 2). Fisher-type unit-root test based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests has 
been implemented to ensure that considered variables are stationary. The result is 
shown below at Table 2. As all the series are stationary at level, then first 
differences is not needed for VAR specification. 
 
Table 2: Unit root test results : Fisher-type unit-root test Based on augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests.21 
  
CAP* ROA** DTA* LZ-score* 
  
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
Inverse chi-
squared(18) P 63.9781 0.0000 32.5528 0.0189 106.7087 0.0000 44.7538 0.0004 
Inverse normal Z -2.9104 0.0018 -1.7180 0.0429 -3.7858 0.0001 -1.8166 0.0346 
Inverse logit t(49) L* -4.4051 0.0000 -1.6940 0.0483 -8.2477 0.0000 -2.4077 0.0099 
Modified inv. chi-
squared Pm 7.6630 0.0000 2.4255 0.0076 14.7848 0.0000 4.4590 0.0000 
Conclusion  
 SL2  SL2  SL2  SL2 
 
Note : * Cross-sectional means removed  lags(1), ** Panel means:  Included. 
 SL2 ≡ Stationary variable. 
2. Pearson Correlation Analysis 
The Pearson correlation test reveals the correlation among the variables. It 
indicates how the variables are related with each other and also to what extent. 
The result is shown below at Table 3 for all banks (Panel A), for Islamic banks 
(Panel B ), and for Conventional banks (Panel C).   
 
In Panel A (and Panel C), for all banks (for conventional banks), results of the 
Correlation analysis between LZ-score=log(Z-score) and DTA depict a positive 
significant coefficient of 0.2892 (0.2490). It denotes that if DTA increases it will 
have a positive impact on the Stability. The same relationship is found between 
the Capital adequaty ratio (CAP) and LZ-score. The test result shows a negative 
relationship between Return on assets (ROA) and LZ-score. It indicates that if the 
ROA increases it will have a negative impact on the Stability. In Panel B, for 
                                                          
21 Ho: All panels contain unit roots, Ha: At least one panel is stationary.        
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Islamic banks, results of the Correlation analysis between LZ-score=log(Z-
score) and Capital adequaty ratio (CAP) a positive significant coefficient of 
0.8011. It denotes that if CAP increases it will have a positive impact on the 
Stability of Islamic banks. 
 
Table 3:  Correlation matrix. 
All banks 
Panel 
A : LZ-score DTA ROA CAP 
LZ-score 1.0000     
DTA 0.2892 1.0000    
 
0.0084    
ROA -0.2016 -0.1066 1.0000   
 
0.0694 0.3405   
CAP 0.2647 0.0268 -0.0435 1.0000  
 0.0163 0.8111 0.6980  
Islamic Banks 
Panel 
B : LZ-score DTA ROA CAP 
LZ-score 1.0000     
DTA 0.2363 1.0000    
 
0.2663    
ROA -0.0651 -0.1326 1.0000   
 
0.7624 0.5369   
CAP 0.8011 0.3322 0.0002 1.0000  
 0.0000 0.1127 0.9991  
Conventional Banks 
Panel 
C : LZ-score DTA ROA CAP 
LZ-score 1.0000     
DTA 0.2490 1.0000    
 
0.0594    
ROA -0.2190 -0.0938 1.0000   
 
0.0987 0.4838   
CAP 0.2186 0.0294 -0.0634 1.0000  
 0.0993 0.8268 0.6364   
 
3. Granger Causality Test 
 
The simple correlation does not imply anything regarding the causality amongst 
the variables. To find out the causal relationship between two variables (Granger, 
1969) causality test is implemented between each pairewise considered variables. 
Granger causality test has been performed with default lag selection. There are 
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four data series i.e.,  LZscore = log (Zscore ), 𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 the debt to assets ratio,𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 the Return on assets, and 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 the Capital adequaty ratio. Each series has 
been analyzed for causality with the others. Results of the Granger causality test 
are presented in Table 4.   
 
Table 4 shows that there is no bilateral directional relationship between LZ-score 
and DTA, ROA and CAP, at 5% significance level. The test results are tabulated 
below. It can be observed from the results that three equations are showing 
significant unilateral causal relationship that is from LZ-score to ROA, from 
CAP to LZ-score, and from CAP to DTA. 
 
 
Table 4: Pairwise Granger causality tests results (all banks). 
 
    
     
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
 DTA does not Granger Cause LZ-score 
 73  0.00545 0.9414  
 LZ-score does not Granger Cause DTA 
 1.42880 0.2360  
     
     
 ROA does not Granger Cause LZ-score 
 73 
 0.01922 0.8901  
 LZ-score does not Granger Cause ROA  3.84783 0.0538  
     
     
 CAP does not Granger Cause LZ-score  73  2.89431 0.0933  
 LZ-score does not Granger Cause CAP 
 1.11960 0.2936  
     
     
 ROA does not Granger Cause DTA  73  0.11331 0.7374  
 DTA does not Granger Cause ROA  0.36097 0.5499  
     
     
 CAP does not Granger Cause DTA  73  7.17195 0.0092  
 DTA does not Granger Cause CAP  0.04776 0.8277  
     
     
 CAP does not Granger Cause ROA  73  0.08915 0.7661  
 ROA does not Granger Cause CAP  1.74513 0.1908  
     
     
 
B. Methodology: PANEL VAR-X model  
 
The analysis applies here a panel VAR-X model, which serves as a useful tool to 
evaluate the magnitude and duration of the effects. Like simultaneous equations 
models, PVAR model is a system of regression equations, it contains several 
endogenous variables. Each variable is regressed with its own lag and the lags of 
other endogenous variables. In addition, the advantage of this model is that it does 
not require any a priori assumptions on the direction of the feedback between 
variables in the model. Thus, PVAR is a generalization of pairwise Granger 
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Causality regression.22 The panel VAR-X will be based on the following 
specification:23 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝜞𝟎 + ∑ 𝛤𝑗  𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑗𝑝𝑗=1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   (6) 𝒀𝒊𝒕 = [𝐋𝐙𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝒊𝒕, 𝑫𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕, 𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕, 𝑪𝑨𝑷𝒊𝒕]’, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = (Share𝑖,𝑡 , Size𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷2008, 𝐼𝐵𝑖)’, 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are exogenous explicative variables, p is the optimal lag parameter to 
be determined, 𝚪𝟎 is Kx1 real parameter vector, Γj are KxK real parameter matrix, 
j=1, …, p, the subscripts ‘i’ and ‘t’ represent individual banks and time period, 
respectively, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are the idiosyncratic errors independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.). 
In this specification, we follow the presumption that the debt to assets 
ratio, 𝐷𝑇𝐴,  the Return on assets, 𝑅𝑂𝐴, and the Capital adequaty ratio, 𝐶𝐴𝑃, affect 𝐙𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞s only with a lag, while 𝐙𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞s  have a contemporaneous effect on bank 
activity mainly through debt to assets ratio, 𝐷𝑇𝐴. Therefore, LZscore𝑖𝑡 appears 
first in the ordering, and 𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 , 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 , 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 appear later (in this order).24  
 
With time series data, it was shown by (Zellner, 1962) that estimating the K 
equations separately by least square (LS) in system of equations (6) is identical to 
generalized LS (GLS) estimation if no restrictions are imposed on the parameter 
matrix (see (Belsley & Kontoghiorghes, 2009) p 309)). If the process is normally 
distributed (Gaussian), this estimator is also identical to the ML estimator and 
consequently there is no loss in asymptotic estimation efficiency.25 
 
This technique may combine the traditional VAR approach, which treat all the 
variables in the system as endogenous, with a panel data approach, which allows 
for unobserved individual heterogeneity (the error components SUR model) as 
given in the following model: 
                                                          
22 According to (Engle & Granger, 1987) argument that if the time series are cointegrated, then 
causality should be tested with VECM instead of unrestricted VAR model if considered series 
are integrated. 
23
 For good introductions to VARs, see (L¨utkepohl, 2005), (Hamilton, 1994 ), (Stock & 
Watson, 2001), and (Becketti, 2013). 
24 Qualitatively and quantitatively, the results remain broadly unchanged for alternative 
ordering. 
25
 If the process is stable (I (0)), LS estimator has an asymptotic normal distribution under 
general conditions. In addition, however, that an asymptotically correct inference is obtained 
by pretending that the result is precise and using it in the usual way to set up t,  χ2 and F 
statistics. 
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 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝝁𝒊 + ∑ 𝛤𝑗  𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑗𝑃𝑗=1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   (7)  𝒀𝒊𝒕 = [𝐋𝐙𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝒊𝒕, 𝑫𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕, 𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕, 𝑪𝑨𝑷𝒊𝒕]’, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = (Share𝑖,𝑡 , Size𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷2008, 𝐼𝐵𝑖)’, 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a vector of four endogenous variables : LZscore𝑖𝑡 = log (Zscore𝑖𝑡), 𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the debt to assets ratio, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the Return on assets, and 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the 
Capital adequaty ratio, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are exogenous explicative variables, and where the 
Banks’ specifics are captured in this framework in the fixed effect parameter, 
denoted in model (7) by vector 𝝁𝐢, and the subscripts ‘i’ and ‘t’ represent 
individual banks and time period, respectively.  
When 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a scalar, linear dynamic panel-data models include p lags of the 
dependent variable Yit as covariates and contain unobserved panel-level effects, 
fixed or random 𝛍𝐢. By construction, the unobserved panel-level effects 𝛍𝐢 are 
correlated with the lagged dependent variables Yit−1, making standard  estimators 
(FE and RE estimators) inconsistent. (Arellano & Bond, 1991) derived a 
consistent generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator for the parameters 
of this model. 26 They build upon the idea  of (Anderson & Hsiao, 1981) by noting 
that they identify how many lags of the dependent variable Yit, the predetermined 
variables Yit−j, and the endogenous variables are valid  instruments and how to 
combine these lagged levels with first differences of the strictly exogenous 
variables Xit into a potentially large instrument matrix. (Arellano & Bond, 1991) 
derive then the corresponding one-step and two-step GMM estimators,27 as well 
as the robust VCE estimator for the one-step GMM estimator. Application of 
the Sargan/Hansen test for joint validity of the instruments as standard practice 
after GMM Estimation will be done.28 In the subsequent section, the robust VCE 
for the one-step GMM estimator will be applied. 
 
If there are r instruments and only K parameters to estimate, then panel GMM 
estimations leaves (r − K) overidentifying restrictions. Sargan/Hansen test 
statistic of overidentifying restrictions is distributed as χ2(r − K) under the null 
                                                          
26 With many panels and few periods, estimators are constructed by first-differencing to remove 
the panel-level effects and using instruments to form moment conditions. 
27 They also found that the robust two-step VCE was seriously biased. 
28 For detailed surveys of the literature on GMM estimation and dynamic panel estimators, see 
(Wooldridge, 2002) and (Baltagi, 2005).  
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hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. If observed test statistic 
is large then the overidentifying moment conditions are rejected and we conclude 
that some of the instruments are correlated with the error and hence are 
endogenous. Then, if test statistic has p-value higher than 0.05, so the restrictions 
are not rejected and we conclude that the overidentifying instruments are valid 
instruments (See (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005)). 
 
When the idiosyncratic errors uit are i.i.d., the first-differenced errors △ uit are 
first-order serially correlated. Serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at 
an order higher than 1 implies that the moment conditions used are not valid. To 
test for autocorrelation aside from the fixed effects, the Arellano–Bond test will 
be applied to the residuals in differences. 
 
C. Findings 
 
Before estimation, lag order for VAR model should be chosen through 
minimizing the value of usual information criteria. Akaike information criterion 
(AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SC), and Hannan-Quinn information 
criterion (H-Q) have been employed for lag selection (See Table 13 in Annexe). 
From Table 13 all information criterion AIC, SC and H-Q are recommending p = 
1 as optimal lag.29    
From Table 15 in Annexe (LS results for model (6)),30 the regression coefficient 
of  LZ-score
-1 is 0.929386, 0.002756, -0.007721, and -0.007814 which affects 
repectively the LZ-score and DTA positively and affects negatively the ROA and 
CAP though the result is not statistically significant at 5% significance level for 
DTA. The regression coefficient of   DTA
-1 is 0.810133 and 0.034465 which 
affects significantly and positively the DTA and CAP repectively. The regression 
coefficient of ROA
-1 is 0.783497 which affects Significantly the ROA. The 
regression coefficient of CAP
-1 is -0.491344, 0.234915, 0.013763, and 0.386420 
which affects the LZ-score negatively and affects positively the DTA, ROA, and 
                                                          
29 The AIC always suggests the largest order, SC chooses the smallest order, and H-Q is in 
between (see (Belsley & Kontoghiorghes, 2009) p 316). 
30
 Statistical inference are based on panel-robust standard errors. 
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CAP repectively though the result is not statistically significant at 5% level for 
DTA. Diagnostic tests (in Table 16, see Annexe) suggest adequate specifications 
as the models show free autocorrelation errors.  
This result implies that stability is significantly sensitive to the increase of 
previous Z-score and to decrease in previous CAP. Islamic Banks are Less 
stable. Profitability is significantly sensitive to the decrease of previous Z-score 
and to increase in previous ROA. Islamic Banks are less profitable. Insolvency 
and capitalization are sensitive to the increase in previous DTA and CAP. While 
CAP is sensitive in addition to decrease of previous Z-score. CAP is lower for 
Large bank, and higher for high share bank and post GFC. 
 
The dynamic behavior of model (6) will be assessed using impulse response 
functions, which describe the reaction of one variable in the system to  innovations 
in an other variable in the system while holding all other shocks at zero.31 From 
Figure 3, we deduce : 
 
 Response of Z-scores to shocks in CAP ratio: An increase of one 
percentage point in CAP ratio leads to a cumulative decline of 5 
percentage point in Z-scores, (in the 7 subsequent year, Figure 3).  
 Response of DTA ratio to shocks in CAP ratio: an increase of one 
percentage point in CAP ratio leads to a cumulative increase of 0.4 
percentage point in DTAs (in the subsequent year).  
 Response of ROA ratio to shocks in Z-score ratio: An increase of one 
percentage point in Z-scores ratio leads to a cumulative decline of 1 
percentage point in ROAs (in the 5 subsequent year). 
 Response of CAP ratio to shocks in Z-score ratio (DTA ratio): An increase 
of one percentage point in Z-scores ratio (DTA ratio) leads to a cumulative 
decline of 2 (0.5) percentage point in ROAs (in the 5 subsequent year). 
 
For equation (7), since the fixed effects are correlated with the regressors due to 
lags of the dependent variable, the Finding uses Arellano-Bond : one-step 
system GMM for each variable (See Table 16 in Annexe) and seemingly 
                                                          
31 The shocks in the VAR were orthogonized using Cholesky decomposition, which implies that 
variables appearing earlier in the ordering are considered more exogenous, while those 
appearing later in the ordering are considered more endogenous. 
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unrelated regression estimator (SURE) for the system of equation (See 
Table 18 in Annexe), the PVAR-X.32  
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Figure 3: Impulse response function from Equation (6) results (LZ ≡ log(Z-score)). 
 
Taking account of individual fixed effect, from Table 16 (Arellano-Bond : One-
step system GMM results for model (7)),33 the regression coefficient of  LZ-score
-
1 is 0.931, 0.01052, -0.029, and - 0.0099  which affects repectively the LZ-score 
and DTA positively and affects negatively the ROA and CAP though the result is 
not statistically significant at 5% significance level for DTA. The regression 
coefficient of DTA-1 is 0.9252 and 0.0276 which affects significantly and 
positively the DTA and CAP repectively. The regression coefficient of ROA-1 is 
0.4551 and 0.578 which affects significantly the DTA and ROA respectively. The 
regression coefficient of CAP-1 is - 0.57, 0.2457, 0.0187, and 0.3727 which affects 
the LZ-score negatively and affects positively the DTA, ROA, and CAP 
repectively though the result is not statistically significant at 5% level for ROA. 
                                                          
32 This transformation preserves the orthogonality between the transformed variables and lagged 
regressors. The estimation uses lagged regressors as instruments and estimate the coefficient 
by GMM methodology.For PVAR model, and with balanced panel data, we have to use a 
forward mean-differencing (Helmert procedure), which removes the mean of all forward 
future observations available for each bank-year (Arellano & Bover, 1995), see (Klein, 2013), 
and (Love & Zicchino, 2006). This will be done in subsequent version since available data are 
unbalanced panel data. 
33 The Arellano–Bond estimator is designed for datasets with many panels and few periods, and 
it requires that there be no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors.  
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Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors are given at 
Table 16. The value of the test for first order and second-order autocorrelation 
present no evidence of model misspecification. 
  
This resul is in line with the previous finding. It implies again that stability is 
significantly sensitive to the increase of previous Z-score and to decrease in 
previous CAP. Islamic Banks are Less stable. Profitability is significantly 
sensitive to the decrease of previous Z-score and to increase in previous ROA. 
Higher share bank are less profitable. Insolvency and capitalization are 
sensitive to the increase in previous DTA and CAP. While CAP is sensitive in 
addition to decrease of previous Z-score. Insolvency is sensitive in addition to the 
increase in previous ROA. Solvency is lower for small bank and is higher for 
high share bank. Capitalization is higher for small banks. 
  
From Table 18 (SURE results for model (7)), with SURE technic (OLS on the 
system of equations), the regression coefficient of  LZ-score
-1 is 0.369, - 
0.0264073, - 0.0275, and 0.04057 which affects repectively the LZ-score and 
CAP positively and affects negatively the DTA and ROA though the result is not 
statistically significant at 5% significance level for DTA. The regression 
coefficient of   DTA-1 is 0.63887 and - 0.0487 which affects significantly and 
positively the DTA and negatively the CAP repectively. The regression 
coefficient of ROA-1 is 0.5944 and - 0.3518 which affects Significantly the ROA 
and CAP respectively. The regression coefficient of CAP-1 is 0.1639 which has 
significant affect only on the CAP. Diagnostic tests (in  
Table 19 given in Annexe) suggest unadequate specification as we reject the 
hypothesis that correlation between residuals is zero for considered model.34 
However, estimation results are presented for reference since for correlated 
residuals case, we have better to use the feasible GLS estimator or Two-stage 
least-squares regression (2LS) estimation methods. 2LS estimation results will be 
reported here after (see Table 7).  
Table 7 (2LS for model (7)) results differ from the previous findings. It implies 
that stability is significantly sensitive only to the increase of previous Z-score. 
Islamic Banks, high share banks and large banks are less stable, but Bank 
are more stable Post GFC. Profitability is again significantly sensitive to the 
decrease of previous Z-score and to increase in previous ROA. Also Higher share 
                                                          
34 The models show global significance at 1% level for each equation. 
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bank are less profitable and profitability is lower Post GFC. In line with 
regression base comparison analysis, 100 ≡ Qatar International Islamic Bank is 
found to be the less profitable Islamic bank. Insolvency is sensitive only to the 
increase in previous DTA. But, again Solvency is lower for small bank and post 
GFC and is higher for high share bank. While CAP is sensitive to the increase 
of previous Z-score and CAP, and significantly sensitive to the decrease in DTA 
and ROA. Capitalization is higher Post GFC and is smaller for large banks. 
All islamic banks are more capitalized.35 
 
These results can be summed up as follow : 
 
 IBs are less stable, less profitable, and more capitalized, 
 Small banks are more stable, less solvent, and more capitalized, 
 High share banks are less stable, more solvent, and less profitable, 
 Post GFC, banks are more stable, less solvent, and less profitable. 
 
All given results are summed up as given in the following Tables (Table 5 and 
Table 6). 
 
Table 5: Comparison analysis IB vs CB; a sum up.  
 
Univariate 
analysis 
Regression analysis 
Bank 
caracteristic 
Size Hshare Across IB 
95  100  101 
GFC 
Credit risk + +  + + + + + 
Liquidity + 
- 
+ 
-  - - - 
Capitalization 
 +  +    + 
Solvency + 
- 
+   +   
Stability 
-  
+  + + +  
Profitability 
   +  
- 
 
- 
Note : 95 ≡ Barwa Bank, 100 ≡ Qatar International Islamic Bank, 101≡ Qatar Islamic Bank 
SAQ. Empty cells suggest that the determinant was not significant. 
 
 
                                                          
35 These Results are similar to ones given by OLS.   
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Table 6:  Sum up comparison results from model (7). 
LS (PVAR) Stability Solvency Profitability Captalization 
IBs 
-  -  
Small Banks 
   + 
High share Bs 
   + 
Post GFC 
   + 
Arellano-Bond Stability Solvency Profitability Capitalization 
IBs 
-   + 
Small Banks 
 -  + 
High share Bs 
 + -  
Post GFC 
   + 
2LS (or SURE) Stability Solvency Profitability Captalization 
IBs 
-    
Small Banks + -  + 
High share Bs 
- + -  
Post GFC + - -  
Note: Empty cells suggest that the determinant was not significant. 
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Table 7: 2LS estimation results. 
 
 
LZ-score 
  
DTA 
  
ROA 
  
CAP 
 
 
Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
LZ-score 
-1 .3692254 .1227157 0.003 -.0264073 .0730633 0.718 -.0275236 .0146336 0.060 .0405712 .0187131 0.030 
DTA -1 -.1278848 .1759113 0.467 .6388679 .1047353 0.000 .0004246 .020977 0.984 -.0487095 .026825 0.069 
ROA -1 -.466796 .9439515 0.621 .0754288 .5620164 0.893 .5944323 .112564 0.000 -.3517977 .1439449 0.015 
CAP -1 .0664699 .3324969 0.842 .1235902 .1979643 0.532 .0196748 .0396495 0.620 .1639397 .0507031 0.001 
Share -3.611944 1.229614 0.003 1.62638 .7320959 0.026 -.7765118 .1466285 0.000 .1386593 .1875061 0.460 
Size -.6709672 .1622183 0.000 -.3580094 .0965826 0.000 .0109892 .0193441 0.570 -.1293768 .024737 0.000 
D2008 .1419235 .0840597 0.091 .1073058 .050048 0.032 -.0167553 .0100239 0.095 .0421658 .0128184 0.001 
Bank             
95 -.3391593 .0990478 0.001 -.0377772 .0589718 0.522 -.0156137 .0118112 0.186 .0260699 .015104 0.084 
96 .5461704 .1153966 0.000 .1651475 .0687056 0.016 .0302864 .0137608 0.028 .0660678 .017597 0.000 
97 -.3675879 .1436467 0.010 .0233747 .0855254 0.785 -.0139402 .0171295 0.416 .0420983 .021905 0.055 
98 .0753755 .0914325 0.410 -.0073273 .0544377 0.893 .0002634 .0109031 0.981 -.0450248 .0139427 0.001 
99 1.15725 .1596595 0.000 .1120595 .0950592 0.238 .0919118 .019039 0.000 .0525515 .0243468 0.031 
100 -.8422886 .1898013 0.000 -.127756 .1130052 0.258 -.0374913 .0226333 0.098 .0518547 .0289431 0.073 
101 -.7745585 .2160101 0.000 .0199775 .1286096 0.877 -.0173519 .0257587 0.501 .1170045 .0329398 0.000 
102 -.6542894 .3383677 0.053 .0135315 .2014597 0.946 .0304245 .0403495 0.451 .2138182 .0515983 0.000 
             
_cons 5.142001 .802443 0.000 1.285774 .477764 0.007 .1453505 .0956894 0.129 .4572792 .122366 0.000 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on interest-free finance by 
investigating the feature of interest-free (IB) and conventional banks (CBs) in 
Quatar over the period 2005–2014.36 Our sample contains 9 banks (6 conventional 
and 3 Islamic). We have 90 observations, or bank-years of data, for banks 
operating in Quatar for the calendar years 2005–2014.  
To distinguish between interest-free and conventional banks [in terms of 
Profitability, Liquidity, Credit and Insolvency risk, and Stability], 12 financial 
ratios are used in this study. All are defined in Table 1. We classify these ratios 
into six general categories: profitability ratios (ROA, and ROE), liquidity ratios 
(CTA, and CTD), credit risk (LLR, NPL, LTA, LTD), insolvency risk (DTA), 
Reglementary risk (CAP), and asset structure ratios (FAA, OBSIA). We use 
also the Z-score as measure of bank stability.  
Three technics are used to do a comparisons study. In first stage, a univariate 
analysis based on t-test is conducted. In second stage, a multivariate regression 
based comparisons is done. And in third stage, a PVAR-X model is considered. 
Results differ from one technic to an other [see sum up in Table 5 for univariate 
analysis (descriptive) and multivariate regression based comparisons and in 
Table 6 for Panel VAR-X model investigations]: 37 
  
i) With univariate (t-test based) analysis, compaired to conventional 
banks, IBs are riskier and less stable, but have a higher liquidity, and 
are more solvent.  
ii) With multivariate regression based comparision, first we compare 
interest-free and CB controlling for bank characteristics. Second, we 
Compare IB and CB cross different Size groups. Third, we do analyse 
cross IB difference. Forth, we take account of Market share side for 
each type of banks. And then, we take account of post 2008 GFC effect 
on IBs caracteristics. Regression based comparision results say that:  
                                                          
36 List of Quatarian banks is given at Annexe, see  Table A 1. 
37 From Table 5, it is the Small IBs wich are more liquid while small CBs are more solvent and 
more stable. IBs with higher market share have higher credit risk, higher capitalization, and 
higher profitability. Post the 2008 GFC, IBs are less liquid, have higher capitalization, higher 
risk, and lower rentability. 
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 IBs show higher credit risk, lower liquidity, lower solvency, and are 
more capitalized.  
 Small IBs are more liquid while small CB are more solvent and more 
stable.  
 A cross IBs, Barwa Bank is the riskier while Qatar International Islamic 
Bank is the less profitable, the less liquid, the more solvent, and 
the more stable (the three IB are more stable than CBs).  
 In banks with higher market share of IB, we find that IBs have higher 
credit risk, higher capitalization, lower liquidity, and higher profitability.  
 
iii) Panel VAR-X(1) model results say that:38 
 IBs are less stable, less profitable, and have higher capitalization, 
 Small banks are more stable, less solvent, and have higher capitalization, 
 Higher share banks are less stable, more solvent, and less profitable, 
 Post GFC, banks are more stable, less solvent, and less profitable. 
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Table A 1: List of Quatarian banks covered in this study.39 
Conventional Banks 
 94 Al Khalij Commercial Bank, 
 96 Commercial Bank of Qatar, 
 97 Doha Bank, 
 98 International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C., 
 99 Qatar National Bank, 
 102 Arab Bank Group outlet40 
Islamic Banks 
 95 Barwa Bank, 
 100 Qatar International Islamic Bank, 
 101 Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ, 
Islamic window or Branch 
 Al Khalij Commercial Bank 
 Doha Bank, 
 Qatar National Bank, 
 Arab Bank Group41 
 
Tables for comparison analysis. 
Table 8:  Descriptive statistics and Student t-test  
  
ALL   CB   IB   
Variable N Mean std N Mean std N Mean std 
Difference 
t-test p-
value 
ROA 82 .0280371 .0302731 58 .0270764 .0334038 24 .0303588 .0213143 0.6579   
ROE 82 .1710475 .1880095 58 .1773095 .2125643 24 .1559143 .1103193 0.6421 
CTA 82 .0689492 .0995492 58 .0809797 .1158331 24 .0398755 .0200496 0.0890  
CTD 71 .3346594 1.334922 51 .0964944 .0696646 20 .9419801 2.451947  0.0153   
LTA 67 .4948697 .2033684 43 .4554107 .2057516 24 .5655671 .1823461  0.0324 
LTD 67 .7594499 .4226365 43 .6706522 .3801973 24 .9185458 .455469  0.0201  
LLR 66 .0187141 .0235819 42 .0195319 .0198481 24 .0172829 .0294277 0.7124  
NPL 66 .0219742 .0291444 42 .026669 .0350288 24 .0137583 .0101238 0.0834 
CAP 82 .1837919 .1004844 58 .1728717 .106104 24 .2101823 .081434  0.1268  
DTA 82 .1582212 .1880161 58 .186064 .207909 24 .0909344 .1033865  0.0363  
Zscore 82 33.34309 24.67625 58 39.35873 25.49786 24 18.80527 14.88073 0.0004 
 
Table 9 : Comparing IB and CB, Controlling for bank caracteristics (Equation 
(1)). 
                                                          
39 Source : Islamic financial instituitions, Global investment and Business Center , USA 2009. 
40
 (Combined) has four branches in Qatar, along with an Islamic banking. 
41
 Merged with Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank in 2019. 
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 Profitability   Liquidity  Credit risk 
Variable Return on 
assets ROA 
    
Return on 
equity ROE 
Cash to assets 
CTA     
Cash to 
deposits CTD 
    
Loans to assets 
LTA     
Loans to 
deposits LTD 
    
IB -.02305872*   -.17917362*   -.06559928*** -1.2329612**  .12126295*   .963959*** 
Size -.15026045*** -.84800812*** -.17192829*** -3.2301069*   -.06986214    .55917917    
AGE .00356023*** .02048295*** .00493062*** .08435535**  .00207893    -.01646901    
Growth -.00994461    .00722158    -.01008688    4.7985985**  -.12394764    -1.6530088**  
FAA -1.7655009*   -10.823657*   .26455596    2.3703382    12.168547*** 46.551446*** 
OBSIA -.04281989    -.31417727    -.06092887    .47539101    .21113323*   -.63659225    
_cons .57726423*** 3.2681832*** .62403374*** 10.09007*   .60796782    -1.1780225    
N 63    63    63    55    47    47    
R2 .75175475    .67877737    .68521349    .80077899    .68094845    .75912886    
F 7.0856278    2.3973505    3.5201562    1.2970402    .    .    
(suite) 
 Credit risk  Reglementary 
risk 
Insolvency Stability 
Variable Loans loss 
reserves to gross 
loans  
LLR 
Non-performing 
loans to gross 
loans  
NPL 
Capital adequaty 
ratio  
CAP    
Debt to assets 
DTA     
Zscore    
IB .11796981 .05026301 .25815529**  1.2920647*** 25.455072    
Size .05084024 -.03063245 -.15629385*** -.03573678    -19.701974*** 
AGE .00381641 .00477594 .01661861**  .06722557*** 1.8432311**  
Growth -.09578532 .01198083 .01144815    .03055816    11.02221    
FAA -1.3662996 -2.8324136 .88007638    .88452569    -198.06652    
OBSIA -.03732337 -.08784498 .02451734    -.08013262    -6.1195284    
Trend -.0036911 -.00360204 -.00842333**  -.04327521*** -1.400849*** 
_cons 3.3600574 3.6201916 8.5675511**  40.742122*** 1423.6011*** 
N 47 47 63    63    63    
R2 .42049036 .44504626 .78094768    .95228089    .96364439    
F . . 8.8404741    56.55891    95.376571    
 
Table 10: Comparing Small IB, Small CB (Equation (2)). 
 Profitability  Liquidity   Credit risk 
Variable Return on 
assets ROA 
    
Return on 
equity ROE 
    
Cash to assets 
CTA     
Cash to 
deposits CTD 
    
Loans to assets 
LTA     
Loans to 
deposits LTD 
    
Small_IB -.01112609    -.05357403    .00319064    1.2400884**  -.0498457    -.06907365    
Small_CB -.01121755    -.06442157    -.04675863    -.425979    -.14336008*** .01149361    
Size -.15381283*** -.86641482*** -.17715893*** -2.8392094**  -.08416828    .56830519    
AGE .00360977*** .02073727*** .00499225*** .07537316*** .0021545    -.01676388    
Growth -.0050102    .03157889    -.00863376    4.0263122*** -.11838227    -1.6702145**  
FAA -1.7922412*   -10.896588    .54031035    15.579876    12.350342*** 45.952883*** 
OBSIA -.04380322    -.31957601    -.06383474    .42837261    .20017808    -.64289418    
Trend                         
_cons .61571367*** 3.4694978*** .69067591*** 7.7685275*   .88508332*   -1.1306587    
N 63    63    63    55    47    47    
R2 .75569902    .68150466    .69327291    .87406919    .71621302    .7598803    
F .    .    .    .    .    .    
 
(suite) 
 Credit risk  Reglementary 
risk 
Insolvency Stability 
Variable LLR NPL  CAP    DTA    Zscore    
Small_IB -.00936043 .00024581  .01905494    .01362837    4.3121803    
Small_CB .00583419 -.01293345  .00802773    -.13227054*** 17.222707*** 
Size .05266609 -.03244099  -.15160845*** -.04964389    -16.715158*** 
AGE -.00201466 .00211606  .00165585    -.00238857    .19853836    
Growth -.09862401 .01357073  .00363916    .03289379    8.3708409    
FAA -1.4647206 -2.7781081  .98586682    1.7005336    -256.76912    
OBSIA -.03799668 -.08836727  .02548801    -.08824197    -4.917134    
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Trend -.00007674 -.00192363  .00088598    .00033419    -.39712656*** 
_cons -.014742 2.0737153  -.17208773    .20821133    451.61423*** 
N 47 47  63    63    63    
R2 .42413999 .44738966  .78454699    .9579639    .97191985    
F . .  .    .    .    
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
Table 11: Comparing Islamic and conventional banks, testing for cross-IB 
variation ; Equation (3). 
 Profitability   Liquidity  Credit risk 
Variable Return on 
assets ROA    
Return on 
equity ROE 
Cash to assets 
CTA     
Cash to 
deposits CTD 
   
Loans to assets 
LTA     
Loans to 
deposits LTD 
    
IB                        
95 -.02890601    -.19313592    -.01954553    .54504521   .07054471    1.5830549**  
100 -.05284145*** -.32719311*** -.08887202*** -1.5423486** .04602729    .80695048**  
101 -.02305872*   -.17917362*   -.06559928*** -1.2329612** .12126295*   .963959*** 
Size -.15026045*** -.84800812*** -.17192829*** -3.2301069*  -.06986214    .55917917    
AGE .00356023*** .02048295*** .00493062*** .08435535** .00207893    -.01646901    
Growth -.00994461    .00722158    -.01008688    4.7985985** -.12394764    -1.6530088**  
FAA -1.7655009*   -10.823657*   .26455596    2.3703382   12.168547*** 46.551446*** 
OBSIA -.04281989    -.31417727    -.06092887    .47539101   .21113323*   -.63659225    
_cons .57726423*** 3.2681832*** .62403374*** 10.09007*  .60796782    -1.1780225    
N 63    63    63    55   47    47    
R2 .75175475    .67877737    .68521349    .80077899   .68094845    .75912886    
F 7.0856278    2.3973505    3.5201562    1.2970402   .    .    
(suite) 
 Credit risk  Reglementary 
risk 
Insolvency Stability 
Variable Loans loss 
reserves to gross 
loans  
LLR 
Non-performing 
loans to gross 
loans  
NPL 
Capital adequaty 
ratio  
CAP     
Debt to assets 
DTA     
Zscore    
               
IB               
95 .07185545 -.03027027 .04192241    -.0125017    18.490943*** 
100 .02574046 -.0160118 -.09207035*   -.20733633*** 58.990453*** 
101 .03753724 -.00753479 -.04727405    -.01555247    54.701044*** 
Size .05084024 -.03063245 -.15629385*** -.03573678    -19.701974*** 
AGE -.00047333 .00169339 .00032904    -.00251402    3.4030163*** 
Growth -.09578532 .01198083 .01144815    .03055816    11.02221    
FAA -1.3662996 -2.8324136 .88007638    .88452569    -198.06652    
OBSIA -.03732337 -.08784498 .02451734    -.08013262    -6.1195284    
Trend -.00101001 -.00167545 .00175765    .00031203    -2.3757148*** 
_cons .85699557 1.8215241 -.93740983    .04907459    2333.7357*** 
N 47 47 63    63    63    
R2 .42049036 .44504626 .78094768    .95228089    .96364439    
F . . 8.8404767    56.558918    95.376564    
Note : 95 ≡ Barwa Bank, 100 ≡ Qatar International Islamic Bank, 101 ≡  Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ. 
Table 12 : Comparing Islamic and conventional banks, testing of High share 
Market for IBs ; (Equation (4)). 
 Profitability   Liquidity  Credit risk 
Variable Return on 
assets ROA 
    
Return on 
equity ROE 
    
Cash to assets 
CTA       
Cash to 
deposits CTD 
    
Loans to assets 
LTA    
Loans to 
deposits LTD 
    
IB -.152288*** -1.1374939*** -.22497316*** 8.1525415*** .33735046*  -.53258652    
HShareIB 1.0140779*** 7.5200559*** 1.2506263*** -77.667956*** -1.6848658   11.668783**  
Size -.21719511*** -1.3443727*** -.25447643*** .49034092    .02186735   -.07610679    
AGE .00483068*** .02990415*** .00649742*** -.01223815    .00070395   -.00694636    
Growth -.01048616    .00320566    -.01075475    -.1943245    -.07166969   -2.0150673*** 
FAA -1.0689817    -5.6585085    1.1235483    .92982129    11.202695** 53.240595*** 
OBSIA -.02188739    -.158949    -.03511356    -.27257335    .18243025   -.43780558    
_cons .79722325*** 4.8993242*** .89530138*** -1.385729    .28374218   1.0674493    
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N 63    63    63    55    47   47    
R2 .8297576    .7930864    .72517398    .97233966    .70324089   .83210442    
F 9.7584261    4.1429468    8.089291    39.757879    .   .    
(suite) 
 Credit risk  Reglementary 
risk 
Insolvency Stability 
Variable Loans loss 
reserves to gross 
loans  
LLR    
Non-performing 
loans to gross 
loans  
NPL     
Capital adequaty 
ratio  
CAP    
Debt to assets 
DTA     
Zscore    
IB -.31278348**  -.18723577    .78137234*** 1.3718939*** 43.271648**  
HShareIB 1.5430441*** .85076791*** -1.8572201*** -.28336298    -63.242021    
Size -.03316803    -.07695098**  -.03370722    -.01703328    -15.527656**  
AGE -.00734326    -.00137702    .02957409*** .06920223*** 2.2843909**  
Growth -.14366283**  -.01441676    .01243996    .03070948    11.055983    
FAA -.48174708    -2.3447095    -.3955548    .6898979    -241.50428    
OBSIA -.01103643    -.07335149    -.01381922    -.08598177    -7.4249641    
Trend .00407073    .00067749    -.01797472*** -.0447325*** -1.7260928*** 
_cons -3.5894467    -.21146508    17.081888*** 42.041186*** 1713.5311*** 
N 47    47    63    63    63    
R2 .67715963    .49549609    .88369926    .95245713    .96440178    
F .    .    56.089029    70.495014    113.94502    
 
Table 13: Comparing Islamic and conventional banks, testing of post GFC effect 
on IBs. 
 Profitability   Liquidity  Credit risk 
Variable Return on 
assets ROA 
    
Return on 
equity ROE 
    
Cash to assets 
CTA     
Cash to 
deposits CTD 
   
Loans to assets 
LTA    
Loans to 
deposits LTD 
    
IB -.63662123**  -5.8973499*** -.88267619*   -1.295371   2.5882376*  -9.702787*   
IB2008 -.03628862**  -.24601581**  -.0645153**  -.10274519   .14438215** -.27707386    
IBTrend .0083944**  .07717749*** .01136408*   .00204971   -.03391502*  .14323985*   
Size -.17242483*** -1.0554627*** -.201288*** -3.218315*  .02247879   .16956817    
AGE .00390394*** .02374047*** .00537881*** .0841004** .00067434   -.00987217    
Growth -.00773542    .0075547    -.00358733    4.8344744** -.11663213   -1.8139362**  
FAA -1.8784156*   -13.303449*   .36489901    3.8659063   11.285472** 47.337082*** 
OBSIA -.0411352    -.26362205    -.06480697    .43886251   .19934664   -.41574572    
_cons .6585811*** 4.0613311*** .72612218*** 10.010556*  .28599275   .23903576    
N 63    63    63    55   47   47    
R2 .77311574    .72224652    .70362724    .80119039   .72204158   .79946662    
F 8.3210733    2.3866412    3.5833647    1.1306848   .   .    
(suite) 
 Credit risk  Reglementary 
risk 
Insolvency Stability 
Variable Loans loss 
reserves to gross 
loans  
LLR     
Non-performing 
loans to gross 
loans  
NPL     
Capital adequaty 
ratio  
CAP    
Debt to assets 
DTA      
Zscore   
IB -3.5603729*** -2.4554768*** 3.4580423*** 1.1723134   114.62764   
IB2008 -.05698077*** -.05437109*   .05331007*   -.00861984   3.7313854   
IBTrend .02623535*** .01796789*** -.02273569*** .00089626   -.64897688   
Size -.02052698    -.07952795*   -.09437571**  -.03790411   -18.027282** 
AGE -.08721668*** -.05749187**  .09555782*** .06414129*  4.0871603   
Growth -.12282445**  -.00054003    .01571952    .03187602   10.640304   
FAA -1.1672554    -2.5603034    1.9259106*   .95054873   -204.57125   
OBSIA -.00007835    -.07022709    .00195478    -.0818519   -5.8792235   
Trend .05395197*** .03580805**  -.05837343*** -.0413279*  -2.819269   
_cons -50.197034*** -32.998681**  54.957355*** 38.930331*  2742.0324   
N 47    47    63    63   63   
R2 .68315338    .52358142    .84069045    .95231112   .96409901   
F 5.7232493    6.8826909    12.9072    55.637812   94.76259   
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Tables for PVAR model Results. 42 
Table 14: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for Equation (6).43   
 
      
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 
 202.4476 NA   3.93e-08 -5.701488 -5.026837 -5.435709 
1 
 445.1565   417.1559*   3.31e-11*  -12.78614*  -11.57177*  -12.30774* 
2 
 456.3991  17.91801  3.91e-11 -12.63747 -10.88338 -11.94645 
       
       Note : Endogenous variables: LZ-score DTA ROA CAP. 
Table 15: PVAR-X(1) estimation results for Equation (6). 
     
  
   Bank-level variables LZ-score DTA ROA CAP 
     
     LZ-score -1  0.929386 
 0.002756 -0.007721 -0.007814 
 
 (0.02974) 
 (0.01355)  (0.00318)  (0.00407) 
 
[ 31.2468] [ 0.20344] [-2.43009] [-1.91939] 
DTA-1 -0.066021  0.810133 -0.007455  0.034465 
 
 (0.14430)  (0.06572)  (0.01542)  (0.01975) 
 [-0.45751] [ 12.3275] [-0.48361] [ 1.74496] 
ROA-1 
 0.229807  0.037518  0.783497  0.206246 
 
 (1.09130)  (0.49699)  (0.11658)  (0.14937) 
 [ 0.21058] [ 0.07549] [ 6.72078] [ 1.38079] 
CAP
-1 -0.491344  0.234915  0.013763  0.386420 
 
 (0.27518)  (0.12532) 
 (0.02940)  (0.03766) 
 
[-1.78557] [ 1.87456] [ 0.46820] [ 10.2598] 
Bank-level caracteristic 
SIZE -0.257815 -0.067637  0.019070 -0.106520 
 
 (0.18167)  (0.08274)  (0.01941)  (0.02487) 
 [-1.41911] [-0.81750] [ 0.98260] [-4.28377] 
 
   
 
SHARE 
 0.634083  0.393953 -0.222760  0.576478 
 
 (1.39738)  (0.63638)  (0.14927)  (0.19126) 
 [ 0.45377] [ 0.61905] [-1.49228] [ 3.01409] 
IB -0.180840 -0.018285 -0.012800  0.011377 
  (0.06782) 
 (0.03089)  (0.00724)  (0.00928) 
 [-2.66643] [-0.59201] [-1.76668] [ 1.22558] 
D2008 
 0.089414 -0.046808 -0.004217  0.039731 
 
 (0.09298)  (0.04235)  (0.00993)  (0.01273) 
 [ 0.96161] [-1.10538] [-0.42457] [ 3.12188] 
C 
 1.238600  0.237212 -0.016600  0.451775 
  (0.59025)  (0.26881)  (0.06305)  (0.08079) 
 [ 2.09842] [ 0.88246] [-0.26327] [ 5.59206] 
     
     R2 
 0.964466 
 0.751031  0.512468  0.766098 
Adj. R2 
 0.960024  0.719909  0.451527  0.736860 
F-statistic 
 217.1359  24.13246  8.409196  26.20236 
Log likelihood 
 13.23315  70.65189  176.5024  158.4094 
                                                          
42 Results for model (6) are done by EVIEWS version 10. Estimation of the standard VAR model in 
EViews is performed using simple OLS applied to each equation. 
43
  * indicates lag order selected by the criterion,  LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% 
level),  FPE: Final prediction error,  AIC: Akaike information criterion,  SC: Schwarz information criterion,  HQ: 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
Note : Exogenous variables: C SIZE SHARE IB @YEAR>2008 
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     Note : Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
Table 16: Dignostic tests : VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests from model (6). 
       
       Null hypothesis: No serial correlation at lag h 
       
       Lag LRE* stat df Prob. Rao F-stat df Prob. 
       
       1  21.97962  16  0.1439  1.403998 (16, 174.8)  0.1444 
2  22.19866  16  0.1369  1.418862 (16, 174.8)  0.1374 
       
       Table 17: Dynamic panel-data estimation for Equation (7). Arellano-Bond : One-step 
system GMM.44 
Variable LZ-score     DTA    ROA45    CAP    
LZ-score-1 .930191*** .01051618    -.02907032*   -.00986975**  
CAP -1 -.57323813**  .24567182*** .01871067    .37271114*** 
DTA -1 -.0676625    .9252001*** .00056115    .02756849*   
ROA -1 .18310809    .45508935**  .57754615*** .14446119    
Share .67254164    .95975343**  -.74688113*** .34744981    
Size -.26702479    -.12622446**  .00557239    -.08422566*   
IB -.17631403*   -.00197859      
D2008 .10670368    .01592556    -.01522316    .02641336    
C 1.2617339    .31268905*       .40855042**  
Fisher 71769.69 789.24 11.55 18.34 
Sargan/Hansen test 0.175 0.356 0.129 0.977 
AB(1) test for AR(1) 0.048 0.041 0.000 0.108 
AB(2) test for AR(2) 0.561 0.133 0.768 0.652 
 
Legend: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Note : p-values are reported for Sargan/Hansen test, Hausman test, 
and AB(1) and AB(2) tests. Fisher global significant test statistic. AB(1) statistic is the Arellano-Bond tests for 
first ordrer autocorrelation and AB(2) statistic is for second order autocorrelation. The Hansen /Sargan-test 
suggests that the instruments used are uncorrelated with the residuals, and the Arellano-Bond tests rejects the 
hypothesis that the errors are not autocorrelated in the first order (AR(1)), but cannot reject this hypothesis for the 
second order (AR(2)). 
                                                          
44 All results of model (7) are done by STATA version 15. 
45
 One-step difference GMM is used. 
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Table 18: SURE estimation results for Equation (7). 
  LZ-score DTA ROA CAP 
 Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
             
LZ-score -1 .369225 .1227157 0.003 -.0264073 .0730633 0.718 -.027523 .0146336 0.060 .0405712 .0187131 0.030 
DTA -1 -.127884 .1759113 0.467 .6388679 .1047353 0.000 .0004246 .020977 0.984 -.0487095 .026825 0.069 
ROA -1 -.466796 .9439515 0.621 .0754288 .5620164 0.893 .5944323 .112564 0.000 -.3517977 .1439449 0.015 
CAP -1 .0664699 .3324969 0.842 .1235902 .1979643 0.532 .0196748 .0396495 0.620 .1639397 .0507031 0.001 
             
Share -3.61194 1.229614 0.003 1.62638 .7320959 0.026 -.776511 .1466285 0.000 .1386593 .1875061 0.460 
Size -.670967 .1622183 0.000 -.358009 .0965826 0.000 .0109892 .0193441 0.570 -.1293768 .024737 0.000 
D2008 .1419235 .0840597 0.091 .1073058 .050048 0.032 -.016755 .0100239 0.095 .0421658 .0128184 0.001 
Bank             
95 -.339159 .0990478 0.001 -.0377772 .0589718 0.522 -.0156137 .0118112 0.186 .0260699 .015104 0.084 
96 .546170 .1153966 0.000 .1651475 .0687056 0.016 .0302864 .0137608 0.028 .0660678 .017597 0.000 
97 -.367587 .1436467 0.010 .0233747 .0855254 0.785 -.0139402 .0171295 0.416 .0420983 .021905 0.055 
98 .0753755 .0914325 0.410 -.0073273 .0544377 0.893 .0002634 .0109031 0.981 -.0450248 .0139427 0.001 
99 1.15725 .1596595 0.000 .1120595 .0950592 0.238 .0919118 .019039 0.000 .0525515 .0243468 0.031 
100 -.842288 .1898013 0.000 -.127756 .1130052 0.258 -.037491 .0226333 0.098 .0518547 .0289431 0.073 
101 -.774558 .2160101 0.000 .0199775 .1286096 0.877 -.0173519 .0257587 0.501 .1170045 .0329398 0.000 
102 -.654289 .3383677 0.053 .0135315 .2014597 0.946 .0304245 .0403495 0.451 .2138182 .0515983 0.000 
C 5.142001 .802443 0.000 1.285774 .477764 0.007 .1453505 .0956894 0.129 .4572792 .122366 0.000 
 
Note : Islamic banks are 95 ≡ Barwa Bank, 100 ≡ Qatar International Islamic Bank, 101≡ Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ. 
 
 
43 
 
 
Table 19: Dignostic tests from Seemingly unrelated regression of model (7). 
Equation Obs Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P 
Breusch-Pagan test of residual 
independence :46 
LZ-score 73 15 .1458595 0.9814 3861.41 0.0000 chi2(6) =    54.313, Pr = 0.000 
DTA 73 15 .0868428 0.7778 255.54 0.0000  
ROA 73 15 .0173934 0.6828 157.13 0.0000  
CAP 73 15 .0222424 0.8484 408.53 0.0000  
 
                                                          
46 Correlation matrix of residuals: 
 
lz DTA ROA CAP 
lz 1.0000    
DTA -0.0029 1.0000   
ROA 0.2300 -0.0350 1.0000  
CAP 0.8170 0.0470 -0.1423 1.0000 
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Other Tables 
Table A 2: Correlation matrix. 
 
ROA ROE CTA CTD LTA LTD LLR NPL CAP DTA Zscore 
ROA 1.0000            
ROE 0.9688* 1.0000           
CTA 0.2375* 0.2220* 1.0000          
CTD -0.3029* -0.3265* 0.0624 1.0000         
LTA 0.0853 0.0669 0.1227 0.1838 1.0000        
LTD 0.0396 0.0322 0.0203 0.1462 0.6381* 1.0000       
LLR -0.0219 0.0608 0.0325 0.1704 0.1271 0.4044* 1.0000      
NPL 0.0906 0.1567 0.1452 0.0645 0.0938 -0.0935 0.6393* 1.0000     
CAP -0.0435 -0.1822 0.6348* 0.6155* 0.0996 0.0030 -0.2712* -0.1801 1.0000    
DTA -0.1066 -0.1417 -0.1752 -0.0539 -0.1378 0.0360 -0.0570  -0.0394 0.0268 1.0000   
Zscore -0.2578* -0.2678* 0.1976 0.1780 -0.0834 -0.0813 -0.0070  -0.0458 0.4401* 0.2756* 1.0000  
 
(SUITE) 
 
Zscore NPL CAP ROA CTD CTA GDPG INF size OBSIA FAA Share AGE 
Zscore 1.0000              
NPL -0.0458 1.0000             
CAP 0.4401* -0.1801 1.0000            
ROA -0.2578* 0.0906 -0.0435 1.0000           
CTD 0.1780 0.0645 0.6155* -0.3029* 1.0000          
CTA 0.1976 0.1452 0.6348* 0.2375* 0.0624 1.0000         
GDPG 0.0633 -0.0317 0.1988 -0.0508 0.0166 0.0240 1.0000        
INF 0.0286 0.0938 0.0731 0.1443 -0.2296 0.0285 0.3702* 1.0000       
size -0.3392* 0.1102 -0.5141* -0.0148 -0.3597* -0.0070 -0.2580* -0.1634 1.0000      
OBSIA 0.1137 -0.1332 -0.0537 0.0808 0.2084 -0.1587 0.2267* 0.2086 -0.2292 1.0000     
45 
 
FAA 0.3950* 0.0745 0.3355* -0.1110 0.0446 0.4182* 0.3019* 0.3171* -0.1578 0.2975* 1.0000    
Share -0.2781* 0.0291 -0.3669* -0.0305 -0.2403* 0.0002 0.0332  0.1320 0.8168* -0.0767 0.0479 1.0000   
AGE -0.1109 0.0903 -0.4847* 0.1549 -0.3462* 0.0254 -0.0949  -0.0822 0.5497* -0.0971 -0.0670 0.5571* 1.0000  
 
 
Table A 3: Unit root test results. 
Series:   Z_SCORE  CAP  CTA  CTD  ROA  
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root 
process)  Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value   
ADF - Choi Z-stat    -0.53638  0.2958 -0.90258  0.1834 -1.40285  0.0803 -2.14888  0.0158 -1.17400  0.1202 
PP - Choi Z-stat -2.55873  0.0053 -4.18702  0.0000 -3.44233  0.0003 -3.21669  0.0006 -1.90825  0.0282 
           
Ho: All panels contain unit roots                    
Ha: At least one panel is stationary            
Inverse chi-squared(42)   P 65.1675 0.0000 83.7577 0.0000 89.8397 0.0000 63.6175 0.0000 58.0707 0.0000 
Inverse normal            Z -5.3093 0.0000 -6.5394 0.0000 -6.2448 0.0000 -5.0681 0.0000 -4.6105 0.0000 
Inverse logit t(109)      L* -5.8457 0.0000 -7.6539 0.0000 -8.0413 0.0000 -5.5826 0.0000 -5.1098 0.0000 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 7.8612 0.0000 10.9596 0.0000 11.9733 0.0000 7.6029 0.0000 6.6785 0.0000 
           
Series:   DTA  Size  ROE      
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root 
process)  Statistic p-value Statistic p-value       
ADF - Choi Z-stat     1.64874  0.9504  0.58078  0.7193 -0.59133  0.2772     
PP - Choi Z-stat  1.40688  0.9203 -4.83301  0.0000 -2.25110  0.0122     
           
Ho: All panels contain unit roots                    
Ha: At least one panel is stationary            
Inverse chi-squared(42)   P 31.5645 0.0247 71.7548 0.0000 63.7450 0.0000     
Inverse normal            Z -2.6714 0.0038 -5.6994 0.0000 -4.8430 0.0000     
Inverse logit t(109)      L* -2.5154 0.0076 -6.4444 0.0000 -5.6274 0.0000     
46 
 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 2.2608 0.0119 8.9591 0.0000 7.6242 0.0000      
 
 
Table A 4 : Granger causality test results. 
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.   Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  
 ROA does not Granger Cause CAP  3.33570 0.0424  FAA does not Granger Cause CTD  3.57855 0.0367 
 CTA does not Granger Cause ROA  3.11184 0.0519  GROWTH does not Granger Cause CTD  4.81367 0.0134 
 CTD does not Granger Cause ROA  1.45009 0.2446  INF does not Granger Cause CTD  4.43694 0.0171 
 ROA does not Granger Cause CTD  4.57549 0.0152  SHARE does not Granger Cause CTD  3.61549 0.0345 
 OBSIA does not Granger Cause ROA  3.11905 0.0539  SIZE does not Granger Cause CTD  4.48513 0.0164 
 CTA does not Granger Cause CTD  4.46888 0.0166  CAP does not Granger Cause Z_SCORE  12.7930 2.E-05 
 FAA does not Granger Cause CTA  3.08896 0.0545  DTA does not Granger Cause Z_SCORE  2.66127 0.0782 
 CTA does not Granger Cause FAA  3.63495 0.0337  CTA does not Granger Cause ROE  2.67166 0.0775 
 GROWTH does not Granger Cause CTA  2.94351 0.0619  SHARE does not Granger Cause CTA  4.67071 0.0131 
 INF does not Granger Cause CTA  4.67651 0.0130  SIZE does not Granger Cause CTA  4.63254 0.0135 
 CTA does not Granger Cause INF  3.07580 0.0536  CTA does not Granger Cause Z_SCORE  6.77787 0.0022 
 CAP does not Granger Cause CTA  3.14681 0.0503     
 
